Abstract: Linking climate action with sustainable development goals (SDGs) might incentivize 11 social and political support to forest conservation. However, further examination of the conceptual 12 entry points for linking efforts for reducing forest-based emissions with those for delivering SDGs 13 is required. This review paper aims to contribute to fulfilling this research need. It provides insights 14 into the links between conserving forests for climate change mitigation and peacebuilding.
Introduction

28
Whether climate finance can be harnessed to deliver forest conservation and other development 29 priorities of countries experiencing armed-conflicts is this paper's overarching research query. This
30
is an important query given that many of the developing countries officially disposed toward 31 implementing approaches for reducing forest-based greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, such as the 32 mechanism for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+), are currently 33 experiencing or emerging from armed-conflicts [1] - [3] . Also it has been recently argued that the long-
34
term success of such approaches will be contingent upon their capacity to mobilize a broad range of 
39 40
4 of 25 aim to reduce overt physical violence (usually in the form of armed conflict), whereas, longer-term 124 measures (i.e., peacemaking and particularly peacebuilding) aim to address the root causes of 125 conflict, which he terms as "structural violence" (e.g., institutions that impede certain social groups' 126 access to services). Galtung argues that achieving sustainable peace requires addressing the structural 127 causes of war and undertaking efforts to support local communities' capacities to manage and 128 overcome conflict. Lederach (1997) 
134
Over the years, peace studies have been moving from solely understanding the conditions of the 135 presence (or absence) of violence, toward a discipline that also puts forward suggestions on how to 136 build resilient, peaceful environments, for example, by means of "peace education" and "peace 137 action" [42] . This evolution is built on the similarities between peace and development studies.
138
Indeed, peacebuilding approaches resemble development programs in a way that it is difficult to 139 determine which output would be specifically attributable to which objective. Some scientists have 140 even considered them as "two faces of the same coin" [42] . Furthermore, some of the metrics to 
143
In practice, there are wide-ranging interpretations of what constitutes a "peacebuilding 144 intervention." Definitions range from "support to safety, security, and political processes" to
145
"provision of basic services and livelihoods" (UN, 2010). The common agreement, however, is that 146 to reduce the risk of a relapse into conflict, interventions should include a relatively narrow set of 147 activities. Even conservation approaches (e.g., those that restrict rural peoples' access to forests) could 148 create conditions for further violence if implemented, for example, in contexts where the root causes 149 of conflict are linked to access to land and forest resources [50] . Therefore, to reduce the risk of a 150 relapse into conflict, the United Nations recommends that any peacebuilding intervention be 151 designed to achieve the following objectives: address drivers and root causes of conflict; build 152 institutions and capacities of individuals, communities, and authorities to manage conflict and 153 deliver services; enhance social cohesion and build trust among social groups; and build trust in and 154 the legitimacy of governments.
155
Links between tropical forests and armed conflicts
156
Identifying opportunities for reducing deforestation as a means to access climate finance while 5 of 25 although the majority originates from the "environmental security" field. According to this 166 discipline, natural resources can influence armed conflict through any of three possible mechanisms: 
230
This debate continues despite the significant reduction in government-led settlement programs, 
234
There is even more divergence in opinion and arguments around the trends of deforestation, in 
240
poverty and reduced rates of forest loss [90] . This may relate in part to the financial and labor 241 requirements for both agricultural production and frontier expansion [62] 
277
Other examples of observed impacts from the way armed groups govern forests include increased 
283
increased forest cover in post-conflict Puerto Rico (i.e., linked to economic development) [106] .
284
Economic and policy approaches for tackling causes of forest cover changes
285
During the last few decades, diverse economic and policy instruments aimed at curbing deforestation 286 and forest degradation have been promoted and abandoned at both international and national levels 287 [107] . Despite these interventions, the annual global rate of deforestation remains above 13 million 
297
At the national scale, the adoption of such policies is usually limited to the environmental sector.
298
Forest conservation is not generally a priority activity for governments, which typically allocate 299 resources to other activities. Policies aimed at curbing deforestation include restrictions on land and 300 natural resource use (e.g., delimitation of "natural protected areas") and attempts to increase the 
331
The scope of the initial proposal has increased over time. COP11 delegates viewed forest degradation
332
(mainly identified as a result of selective and illegal logging) as an important cause of GHG emissions. 
361
For developing countries to achieve the status of being "ready" for REDD+, they must undertake four 362 main actions: (1) establish forest reference emissions levels (FREL); (2) 
496
In the subsequent phase, the initiative will establish an emissions reduction program, which will 497 include a performance-based payment mechanism, to achieve sustainable (low-carbon) landscape 498 management and promote the adoption of suitable land uses among farmers.
500
ISFL will provide result-based finance at jurisdictional scale based on a comprehensive carbon 501 estimation approach of AFOLU emissions [138] . Accounting for emissions reduction from AFOLU
502
for result-based payments on a jurisdictional scale has yet to be tested in the country or elsewhere.
503
Thus, OSIL's first phase will also put in place a set of tools needed to assess the program's 
513
The first phase of OSIL will also develop and test approaches for sustainable landscape management 514 with a strong focus on reducing deforestation, as well as an emphasis on promoting sustainable (low-515 carbon) agricultural production systems. Specifically, it will implement activities oriented toward 
532
climate change mitigation activities. In this way, the evidence of co-benefits serves as something of a 533 self-fulfilling prophecy -that is, sufficient evidence might secure the necessary level of social and 534 political support to make forest conservation viable. Meanwhile, the counter-logic is that, in the 535 absence of evidence of co-benefits, political will is liable to fail, as might social support, leading to yet
536
another failed attempt to tackle deforestation and forest degradation [107] , [123] .
538
Recognizing that REDD+ is at a cross-roads, where political and public confidence, or lack thereof, 539 may determine its future, this paper investigates the role of climate finance to contribute toward 540 achieving SDGs. Specifically, it examines the opportunities to harness climate finance to achieve 541 forest conservation, long-lasting peace, and sustainable food production. This idea is framed in 
548
Findings from the literature review suggest that harnessing climate finance for conserving forests
549
and promoting peace is, in theory, viable if activities are designed in accordance with social,
550
institutional, and economic factors. Meanwhile, the Orinoquia region of Colombia provides evidence 551 that these two seemingly intractable challenges can be proposed to be solved together. It also offers 552 lessons on how to implement sustainable (and low-carbon) forest landscapes in a region that, while
553
emerging from a long period of armed conflict, aspires to become a center of agricultural production.
555
First, there are common elements among strategies implemented to achieve sustainable development, 
616
companies have been pledging to achieve deforestation-free supply chains as a way to reduce carbon 617 emissions and loss of biodiversity [144] . This is a trend among hundreds of corporations.
619
This approach to transform supply chains assumes that companies will not only commit but actually 620 take ambitious actions to reduce deforestation. However, this is a big question mark [144] . 
676
Finally, the paper's findings are expected to inform emerging scholarly arguments on the potential 677 of climate finance to bring about improved environmental and peacebuilding outcomes. However,
678
at a time when forest carbon storage is being designed and targeted at (post-) conflict areas in
679
Colombia and elsewhere, they might also demonstrate to government agencies (both environmental
680
and non-environmental) the compatibility of programs aimed at reducing forest-based emissions
681
with efforts relating to peacebuilding, forest conservation, and sustainable food production. Further 
